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There is a pronounced tendency to view each legal system which
deals with a particular natural resource as a unique entity. In this
article Professor Kratchman advances the thesis that there is a systematic pattern of development common to all natural resource legal
systems. The author proposes that the recognition and study of these
similarities may serve many useful functions.

THE RISE AND FALL OF
NATURAL RESOURCE SYSTEMS
Jack Kratcman*

N 1956, A. E. Coleman discovered, claimed, and began to

exploit a deposit of quartzite stone located on public domain' in southern California. Twelve years later the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled that he could be ejected from his claim 2
This order affirmed the determinations of the Secretary of
the Interior that a discovery of valuable mineral3 had not
taken place, which would have entitled Coleman to a patent
for the land he claimed and, furthermore, quartzite stone
*Associate Professorial Lecturer, George Washington University; Staff,
National Science Foundation; B.S. 1948, City College of New York; M.S.
1952, New York University; J.D. 1964, George Washington University;
Member Maryland State Bar.
1. Public domain refers to land which has come into federal ownership by
purchase, cession, or treaty; which has not been reserved by the Federal
Government for special purposes or remains unappropriated; and is subject to the public land laws of the United States.
2. 390 U.S. 599 (1968).
3. The Mineral Location Act of 1872 states the basic national minerals policy
that all valuable mineral deposits are to be free and open to exploration.
Act of May 10, 1872, ch. 152, § 1, 17 Stat. 91 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 22,
(1970)). In order to prevent wrongful claims, Congress required a discovery of valuable mineral deposit before a claim could be validated or
title, known as patent, issued to private ownership. Id. § 2 (codified at
30 U.S.C. § 23 (1970)).
Copyright@ 1973 by the University of Wyoming
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was a "common variety" 4 of mineral which cannot serve
as a basis for claims for land patents.
In 1958, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld 5 contracts between the Secretary of the Interior and several irrigation
districts in California which withheld project water 6 from
lands in excess of 160 acres in single ownership held by certain landowners in the Central Valley of California. In so
doing, the U.S. Supreme Court overruled the determination
by the California Supreme Court that the limitation on delivery of project water was inapplicable and improper under
State law and that the contract was, therefore, invalid under
Section 8 of the Reclamation Act.7 According to the U.S.
Supreme Court, the United States was only required to
comply with State law when "in the construction and operation of a reclamation project it becomes necessary for it to
acquire water rights or vested interests therein .... We read

nothing in § 8 that compels the United States to deliver water
on conditions imposed by the State."'
At first glance, there would seem to be little resemblance
between ejectment from a building stone claim and refusal to
deliver water to excess lands in an irrigation project. But,
on closer examination, some basic similarities become apparent. Both cases are concerned with the development and use
of natural resources in a systems context, there is an interaction between private parties and governmental institutions,
and public policy strongly influenced the outcome of each
4. To prevent mining claims based on discovery of minerals of widespread
occurrence, the mining laws were amended in 1955, so that:
"A deposit of common varieties of sand, stone, gravel,

5.
6.

7.

8.

pumice,

pumicite, or cinders shall not be deemed a valuable mineral deposit
within the meaning of the mining laws of the United States so as
to give effective validity to any mining claim hereafter located
under such mining laws."
Act of July 23, 1955, ch. 375, § 3, 69 Stat. 368 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 611
1970)).
Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275 (1958).
Section 5 of the Reclamation Act of 1902, generally provides that no
right to the use of water from water supply facilities constructed by the
project water, shall be sold for lands in excess
Federal Government i.e.,
of 160 acres in single ownership. Act of June 17, 1902, ch. 1093, § 5, 32
Stat. 389 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 431 (1970)).
Section 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902 provides that the Act is not to
be construed as interfering with state laws "relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation. . . ." Also, it requires that the Secretary of the Interior shall administer the Act "in conld. § 8, at 390 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 383
I."
formity with such laws ..
(1970)).
Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. McCracken, supra note 5, at 291-92.
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case. In addition, economic, social, and technologic factors
had a marked influence in the way in which rights to the
natural resource were allocated or denied. These and other
similarities are common to other natural resources whether
they be familiar like land, water, minerals, and oil and gas,
or less familiar resources like geostationary orbits' or oyster
beds.
Based on a comparison of these similarities, as they
change over time, a thesis is propounded in this article that
each of these natural resources has a systematic pattern of
legal development, the basic elements of which are quite analogous from one natural resource legal system to anothar.
The pattern generally followed by natural resource systems
is to pass through successive stages of maturation and decline, moving from unfettered exploitation to legitimation,
and then to correction of abuses in exploitation, and on to
regulation, and eventually to disintegration. The various
stages through which natural resource systems evolve are described in this article as well as some of the forces and means
which cause or effect system change. With this perspective,
the thesis is assessed in terms of its research and policy implications.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCE SYSTEMS

Embryonic Stage-Unfettered Exploitation
In the first or embryonic stage, there is little or no legal
framework within which participants operate. Where applicable law exists, it is often ineffective, tardy, subverted, or
defied. The technical and economic environment is usually
primitive, relafively few individuals are involved, and the
system is comparatively unintegrated with few or no substantive interactions between parties. Simple, uncomplicated
principles, e.g., "first in time, is first in right," govern allo9. The geostationary orbit is a band of space about 22,300 miles above the
Equator in which communications satellites orbit about the earth. The
satellites appear to be stationary above a fixed point on the earth's surface
because the speed of the satellite equals the speed of the earth's rotation.
The geostationary orbit has only a limited capacity for satellites, and its
communications potential represents a modern-day resource with problems of allocation and use similar to traditional natural resources.
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cation of resources, and serve to resolve conflicts and establish priorities.
Reflecting the rapid rate of development and exploitation of natural resources within the United States, all significant resource legal systems have matured beyond the embryonic stage. At present, examples of natural resource systems in the embryonic stage must be sought in the internation commons" such as outer space and the high seas.
Despite the fact that man has sailed the seas for several
millennia, the oceans as a resource are still in an embryonic
stage of development. Except for technical portents of the
future such as offshore oil and gas rigs and whaling ship
factories, the technical level of exlploitation is not high, the
rate of usage generally is modest as compared to the available resource, the operating units are generally unintegrated
with few significant interactions between each other, and the
applicable law often does not adequately order the relationships among national entities and the individuals involved.
For some centuries prior to World War II, there was
comparatively little change in the legal status of the oceans
and the sea floor. Coastal states generally claimed jurisdiction of territorial waters within three miles of the high water
mark. The balance was available to all in seeming abundance.
This situation changed in 1945 when the United States
claimed the natural resources of the American Continental
Shelf.1 This was followed in 1952 by Ecuador, Peru, and
Chile, claiming the ocean and sea floor for 200 miles, and in
1953, the United States passed the Outer Continental Shelf
10. Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). Each
incremental use of a shared resource returns a full unit of value to the
individual, but the negative effects are shared by all. This tends to lead
to the destruction of the resource held in common.
11. Proclamation 2667, September 28, 1945 stated:
"[T]he exercise of jurisdiction over the natural resources of the
subsoil and sea bed of the Continental Shelf by the contiguous
nation is reasonable and just ....
[T]he Government of the United States regards the natural resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the Continental Shelf beneath
the high seas but contiguous to the coasts of the United States as
appertaining to the United States [and] subject to its jurisdiction
and control."
10 Fed. Reg. 12303 (1945).
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which extended its claims seaward without speci-

fying any limit. In an effort to cope with these unilateral
attempts to acquire a natural resouce increasingly perceived
as having enormous value, a Conference on the Law of the Sea
was held in Geneva in 1958. Some international agreements
were forthcoming from this Conference, but these agreements
established no seaward boundaries for the sea floor contiguous to coastal states. The 1958 conference may be considered
as an initial step toward modifying the embryonic nature of
much of the system of ocean resources, but in the absence of
governing treaties or law, other Latin American, Asian, and
African countries began to claim exclusive fishing rights for
100 miles out to sea. At the same time, incidents of fishing
vessel seizure were on the increase.
More recently, iPresident Nixon proposed on May 23,
1970," s that claims to seabed resources beyond the depth of
200 meters be renounced by all and that an international
trusteeship be established for exploitation of the mineral
wealth of this "common heritage" of all mankind. Apparently, the requisite degree of maturation has not yet appeared
on the international scene because the U.S. proposal has been
resisted, American fishing vessels continue to be seized off
Ecuador, threats are made by Spain to control passage of
vessels through the Straits of Gibraltar, and the Latin American claims to exclusive and extremely broad control of the
seas adjacent to their coasts are receiving increased support
from less developed Asian and African countries. The latest
in the series of events is the unilateral extension by Iceland
of its exclusive fishery zone around Iceland from twelve miles
to fifty miles. This was done in defiance of an injunction imposed by the International Court of Justice.
The rush to gain control of a newly perceived resource
is still on, and priorities still depend more on aggressive
action and force than statute. As the disadvantages of individual action manifest themselves still further with the
passage of time, the trend begun with the Geneva Conference
12. Act of Aug. 7, 1953, ch. 345, 67 Stat. 462 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-3
13.

nt about U.S. Oceans Policy, PUBLIC PAPRES OF THE PRESIDENTS
OF THE UNITED STATES, RICHARD NIXON, 454-56, May 23, 1970.
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of 1958 and the Nixon proposal can be expected to advance
to the point where a framework can be created within which
the multiplicity of national interests and current technical
and economic limitations of ocean exploitation can be resolved.
Unlike fisheries or oil and gas, the absorptive capacity
of the high seas was not widely thought of as a resource until
recently. As a result, the ocean has been used as a free resource for dumping of wastes of all kinds, and chemical
degradation of the seemingly limitless ocean vastness has
taken place. Recognition of this dangerous trend has come
slowly, but it is now emerging. The United States proposed
to the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in June 1972, a draft ocean-dumping convention. This
convention would require the establishment of national systems to regulate ocean dumping based upon internationally
agreed upon principles for the protection of ocean water
quality and the marine environment. As another example of
attempts to beneficially use this resource, on November 13,
1972, representatives of ninety-one countries, including all of
the world's major maritime nations, agreed on a global convention to end the dumping of poisonous waste matter at sea.
When fifteen of the legislatures of the signatory countries
sign the "Convention on the Dumping of Wastes at Sea," it
will take effect.
While no significant embryonic systems remain in the
United States, it is possible to observe the development of
more mature systems such as those for the land, water, and
locatable minerals, 14 and to note their characteristics when
they were in their embryonic stages.
During the period 1781-1867, the U.S. Government acquired by state cession, treaty, and purchase, 1.8 billion acres
of land and water for less than a nickel an acre. Into this
vast, almost empty, and untouched territory there poured a
host of people bent on development.
14. Metallic and other minerals subject to claim location under the general
mining law are known as locatable minerals. See supra note 3. These
are distinguished from 'deposits of oil, gas, coal, phosphate, sodium, and
certain other non-metallic substances which can only be acquired by federal
lease if situated on the public domain.
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At first, the young Federal Government tried to sell or
lease the public lands to meet its revenue needs.'" When this
failed, settlement and development replaced revenue- as a
national policy. From the mid-1800's until the passage in
1916 of the Stock Raising Homestead Act,'" the last of the
general land acts for development, various homestead and
desert land laws were passed to dispose of vacant public land
according to the use for which it was best suited."'
In the meantime, settlers were quick to take and hold
land either before or in defiance of federal land laws.' 8 For
example, under the homestead laws, cattlemen were unable
to secure title to grazing land in the amount needed for a
viable operation. As a result, they took what they needed in
whatever way they could. Although the public domain was
open to everyone on an equal basis, the key to control was
water. Ranchers proceeded to take control of springs, claimed
both banks of streams, and then leased the range back to the
divide, or diverted streams upstream from new settlers'
ranches. In order to limit access of others to land and to
increase their own holdings, cattlemen purchased alternate
sections, in checkerboard fashion, from the railroads on easy
terms and fenced the outside of their purchase, thereby illegally enclosing an equal amount of alternate sections owned
by the Federal Government. While there was no statutory
basis for doing so, they claimed lands through publication
in newspapers or by prior possession. In an effort to keep
others out, they formed exclusive associations which denied
latecomers use of local roundups, common corrals, and group
protection against Indians and rustlers. Fraud was often
15. For a discussion of the credit sales experiment and the cash sales phase of
public land disposal by the Federal Government see GATES, HISTORY OF
PuLmc LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT cbs. 7-9 (1968).
16. Act of Dec. 29, 1916, ch. 9, 39 Stat. 862 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 291-302
(1970)).
17. For example, the Homestead Act of 1862 offered 160 acres of free land
to settlers after meeting the requirements of settlement, residence, and
cultivation. Act of May 20, 1862, ch. 75, § 1, 12 Stat. 392 (codified at 43
U.S.C. § 161 (1970)). The Desert Land Act of 1877 permitted acquisition
of up to 640 acres (reduced to 320 acres by Act of Aug. 30, 1890, ch. 837,
§ 1, 26 Stat. 391) of arid land subject to the payment of a nominal fee and
irrigation of the land applied for. Act of March 3, 1877, ch. 107, § 1, 19
Stat. 377, as amended, 43 U.S.C. § 321 (1970).
18. Scott, The Range Cattle Industry: Its Effect on Western Land Law, 28
MONTANA LAw REviEW 155 (1967).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1973

7

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 8 [1973], Iss. 2, Art. 2

436

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. VIII

resorted to and it was commonplace to use dummy entrymen
and then buy the land from them at bargain rates.
When gold was discovered in California in 1848, mineral
exploitation, as in the case of land, did not pause until Congress spelled out its statutory guidelines. When the gold
rush started, no positive mineral policy existed in theUnited
States. Mineral lands were excluded from disposition under
the various developmental land acts and other laws of local
applicability. But there was no statutory policy which provided for disposition of lands in the public domain which
contained minerals.
Despite the absence of legal opinions on title, the abrogation of Mexican mining laws, and the vacuum created by the
absence of state or federal laws, mineral exploitation began.
At the outset, the miners did not interfere with one anotherthere was always a new, better claim downstream. But as
the gold rush gained momentum, diverse associations and
mining districts were created to settle disputes among the
miners and to cope with squatters, claim jumpers, and other
latecomers. These mining districts developed distinctive rules
and regulations called "customs of the diggings," which were
described as: "[A] special kind of law-a sort of Common
Law of the miners . . . [which] presented in the value of a

"Mining Right," a novel and peculiar questions of jurisdiction ..

Out of this ad hoc lawmaking there emerged a simple
principle for resource allocation-first in time became first
in right." This principle was well suited for the conditions
existing at the time. The mining camps were small compared
to the potential resources so there was enough for all and
those who established the principle were not constrained.
The mining operations were independent of one another and
the principle preserved that status while providing an easy
basis for resolving disputes if and when they arose. In the
rough and isolated terrain of the mining camps, where even
the primitive equipment of a miner involved a comparatively
19. Sparrow v. Strong, 70 U.S. (3"Wall.) 97, 100 (1865).
20. Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U.S. 453, 461 (1878).
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large individual investment, the principle also provided
needed economic protection.
A similar approach was followed by those concerned with
the use of water in the arid western states. In these states,
the appropriation doctrine was established which recognized
that priority of right to water was governed by precedence
in taking water and using it beneficially. In the words of the
Colorado Supreme Court: "The right to water in this country, by priority of appropriation thereof . . .and the obligation to protect it, existed prior to legislation on the subject of
irrigation."2 1
Early Youthful Stage-Legitimation
The transformation from an embryonic to a youthful
stage of development may begin when increased numbers of
participants threaten "established rights," e q., claim jumpexs, or when the sphere of operations of existing participants
becomes visibly preemptive of limited resources or expands
to the point where conflicting interactions are more frequent.
As might be expected in an individualistic milieu, where the
reach of the law is minimal, self-help actions such as the
"customs of the diggings" cited before may be tried first.
Although such self-help may be temporarily effective, resort
to legislation tends to take place next in order to protect or
maintain existing rights. The resulting legislative framework institutionalizes the operative principles informally releton before to assnre minimum disturbance to freedom of
individual action and maximum access to natural resources.
The legal system controlling oyster fishing in the waters
of Maryland's Chesapeake Bay provides a current example
of protection of special interests and existing rights by exclusion of others. This is accomplished primarily through a
variety of limitations on access to the oyster beds and restrictions on the allowable take of oysters as enforced by the State
of Maryland."2
21. Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Company, 6 Colo. 443 (1882).
22. Power, More About Oyster. Than you Wanted to Know, 30 MARYLAND LAW
RRmEw 199 (1970).
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Access limitations are effected through license requirements; prohibitions against non-Maryland residents, except
for Virginia"; establishment of "county waters"24 (from
which non-county residents, even other Marylanders, were at
one time excluded 2") ; and prevention of corporations from
oyster fishing.2 6
In addition to protecting the individual oysterman from
competition from other individuals, as well as the threat of
corporate capital and technological expertise, the legislature
of Maryland established protective restrictions by limiting
allowable oyster production. In general, these productive restrictions consisted of limiting what can be taken, by what
means, where, and when. At the present time, only oysters
exceeding three inches in length may be taken and old oyster
shells must be returned to the bottom. 7 The manner of taking
was first restricted as a consequence of the arrival in the
early 1800's of fishermen from New England in the Chesapeake Bay.2" This new competition used dredges to scoop up
the oysters by dragging instead of the forceps-like tongs
which had been used historically by Chesapeake Bay fishermen. Banned at first, dredges were later permitted in deeper
water (where tongs were ineffective), and the shallow waters
were reserved for the use of tongs.29 Even more important
than geographic limitations on equipment usage is the prohibition against the use of motor power in oyster dredging
operations,"° in which the rate of taking is several orders of
magnitude greater than that of using tongs. The timing of
the take is still another method of restricting production.
Oysters may not be taken during months without the letter
"R" in their names, and the season is longer for tongers
than it is for dredgers.
23. In return for Virginia allowing toll-free access to the Chesapeake Bay,
Maryland agreed to permit Virginia oystermen free access to the Potomac
and Maryland portions of the Bay. Potomac River Compact of 1958, art.
III, § 4 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, § 261A (19'70)).
24. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, §§ 700, 703 (1970).
25. Ch. 87, Sec. 6 [1829] Md. Laws.
26. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, §§ 700 (a), 702(b), 708(e) (1970).
27. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, § 699(a) (1970).
28. BREWINGTON, CHESAPEAKE BAY 171 (1956).

29. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, §§ 700(i), 702(b),
30. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, § 702(k) (1970).

(c), 703(h)
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Private oystermen in Chesapeake Bay also prevented
intrusion on their established methods of exploitation by attacking efforts to lease barren bottoms for private oyster
culture. Like the cattlemen of the West who sought to preserve the open range through special preference state legislation,3 oyster fishermen opposed any actions which would
change the status quo by threatening open public fishing by
expanding private oyster farins. Applications to lease barren bottoms were contested successfully in the courts and a
variety of laws passed 2 which hail the effect of hampering
the issuance of leases, keeping their size and quality down,
and restricting the use of equipment.
The main thrust of the Chesapeake oyster industry
has been e-clusionary and' conservative. Thanks to the unusual practice of the Maryland Legislature, by which local
bills or local exemptions from general bills nay be requeste(d
1) county delegations, time'lhas been made to stand still for
the oyster industry which now is often.called picturesque, or
quaint. The pursuit of traditional ways has not only sueceeded in excluding other entrepreneurs, but capital and
technology as well, e.g., Japanese oyster production through
use of raft culture with oysters growing suspended beneath
the water surface.
Other natural resource systems which have not become
"frozen" in their development as did thd oyster industry,
encouraged the influ*$of capital and technology while legitimating existing rights and p-rotecting the interests of participants. The assuraiice provided by statutory legitimation,
judicial formalization, and public policy stimulated a developmental ambience which led to increased investment, economies of size, and the application of increasingly advanced
technology.
Thus, we see in the Mining Act of 1866"s an explicit recognition of the unrestricted right to go upon the public domain
and to claim, if the first to make, disCovery, an'y valuable
mineral found therm. This claim, good againt any to come
31. Scott, supra note 18, at 166-68.
32. Power, supra note 22, at 213-16.
33. Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, 14 Stat. 251.-
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later, required only minimal public notice, did not even have
to be reported to the Federal Government and could be, for
all practical purposes, maintained indefinitely at nominal
expense.
In 1870, these principles were extended to placer84 claims.Two years later, these two enactments were consolidated into

the Mineral Location Law of 1872"' which now governs acquisition of minerals on the public domain. Between 1873
and 1901, statutes followed which disposed of lands valuable
for coal,"6 building stones,"7 petroleum," and other deposits

in somewhat similar terms. It was not until 1920 that the
Federal Mineral Leasing A&et, inaugurated a new phase of
resource system evolution, to be discussed later, at least for
petroleum and certain other minerals. 0
At the same time that Congress legitimated priority in
time as a principle for nineyal disposition, it also confirmed
the appropriative principle "' and protected the existing water
rights necessary for exploitation. Also, alL land patents
granted, or preemption acreage, or homesteads allowed were
made subject to any vested and accrued water rights. The
Desert Land Act of 1877"2, which allowed entry and reclamation of desert lands in certain western states, further extended
the vesting of rights in water. - The act provided that the
right to use water depends on bona fide prior appropriation,
not to exceed the amount of water taken and used for irrigation. Significahtly, the Act also provided:
34. Act of July 9, 1870, ch. 235, § le, 16 Stat. 217.
35. Act of May 10, 1872, ch. 152, 17 Stat. 91, as amended, 30 U.S.C. §§ 21-54
(1970).
36. Act of March 3, 1873, ch. 279, § 1, 17 Stat. 607 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 71
(1970)).
37. Act of Aug. 4, 1892, ch. 375, §§ 1, 3, 27 Stat. 34 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 161
(1970)).
38. Act of Feb. 11, 1897, ch. 216, 29 Stat. 526.
39. Act of Feb. 25, 1920, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 437, as amended, 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287
(1970).
40. Sodium, 30 U.SC. § 261 (1970); Sulfur, 30 U.S.C. § 271 (1970); Potash,
30 U.S.C. § 281 (1970).
41. Section 9 of the Mining Act of 1866 states:
by priority of possession, rights to the use of water
for mining, agricultural, manufpcturing, or other purposes, have
vested and accrued, and the same are-recognized and acknowledged
by the local customs, laws, and the decisions of the courts, the possessors and owners of such vested rights shall be maintained and
p'rotected in the same....
Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, 14 Stat. 251.
42. Act of March 3, 1877, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377, as amended, 43 U.S.C. § 321-39
(1970).

rW]henever,
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[A]ll surplus water over and above such actual appropriation and use, together with the water of all
lakes, rivers, and other sources of water supply
upon the public lands and not navigable, shall remain
and be held free for the alipropriation and use of
the public for irrigation, mining and manufacturing
purposes subject to existing rights. 3
In the words of the Supreme Court, the Desert Land Act,
"[S]imply recognizes and gives sanction, in so far as the
United States and its future grantees are concerned, to the
state and local doctrine of appropriation, and seeks to remove what otherwise might be an impediment to its full and
4
successful operation. '4

In the case of ranchers, they were able to persuade state
legislatures to support ranchers' rights by such devices as
making it a crime to drive stock from accustomed ranges;
animals running at large x'ere, by law, deemed to commit no
trespass'if they wandered on unenclos.ed private lands; _nd
giving rights by state law to graze on public domain, which
did not belong to the state, but which helped nonetheless
against outside interference except from the Federal Government w4o, of course, had title. Although Congress forbade
enclosures on public domain, this effort was only partially
successful in changing range practices."5
Late Youthful Stage--Correcti6h
Development and exproitatton surgied forward even more
rapidly under the institutionalized encouragement of the
new statutes. Almost inevitably, however, there followed
abuses and fraud, 6 as well as dangers of rapid resource depletion. 7 Inevitably, there also occurred an increase in the

number of parties competing for the resource involved, intensified conflicts of interest in how to achieve an integration of the physical and technological aspects of the natural
43. 43 U.S.C. § 321 (1970).
44. California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142,
164 (1935).
45. Scott, supra note 18, at 16871.
46. See CLAWSON & HELD, THE FEDEFRAL LANDS 26-27 (1957); GATES, supra note
15, ch. 17. The plunder of timberlands is described in the Report of the
Public Lands Commission, H.R. ExEc. Doc. No. 46, 46th Cong.; 2d Sess.

(1880).
47. See quote infra p. 444.
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resource system, and the beginnings of change from single,
simple developmental objectives to multipurpose, complex
objectives in resource policy.
Out of this new environment a later stage of youthful
development begins to emerge. In this new stage, an effort
is made to correct the deficiencies of previous policy and to
allow for expanded participation, but still within the framework of those same policies.
There is great variety to the corrections or constraints
which can be applied. In the case of minerals made available
under the General Mining Law of 1872, the key to acquisition
of mineral land is the discovery of a valuable mineral deposit.
At first, a liberal interpretation of this requirement prevailed. To determine whether a mineral deposit was valuable,
a "prudent man" test was established in 1894.4" In the early
youthful stage of mineral development, this test was construed in such a way that virtually any showing of profitability, even on minerals of widespread occurrence, was sufficient4 9 to constitute the basis for a mineral claim.
Subsequently, to correct the most flagrant abuses from
people making claims based on widespread minerals of occurrence, and as part of a general shift in national policy
toward multiple use of public lands, some limitations were
placed on disposal of mineral lands under the General Mining
Law of 1872. In 1955, Congress drew a distinction between
common and other varieties of minerals and removed deposits
of sand, stone, gravel, and additional common varieties of
minerals from operation of the mining laws " In addition
to the Congressional action, the Department of the Interior
began to apply the prudent man rule more rigorously and
require demonstrafion not only of physical evidence of mi48. Castle v. Womble, 19 L.D. 455, 457 (1894). In language later approved
by the Supreme Court in Chrisman v. Miller, 197 U.S. 313, 322 (1905), a
valuable mineral deposit was defined as one in which "the evidence is of
such a character that a person of ordinary prudence would be justified in
the further expenditure of his labor and means, with a reasonable prospect
of success in developing a valuable mine....
49. Layman v. Ellis, 52 I.D. 714 (1929).
50. Act of July 23, 1955, ch. 375, § 3, 69 Stat. 368 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 611
(1970)).
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eralization but also of economic value as indicated by current
marketability of the deposit. 1
The General Mining Law of 1872, after 100 years, continues to serve as the basic legal framework for locatable
minerals subject to the comparatively minor constraints indicated above Despite continuing abuses of various kinds, uncertainty as to what constitutes discovery, problems related to
dormant claims, the environmental impact of mining operations, the lack of notice to the Federal Government that a
claim has been made, and conflicts arising from the inability
to find claims on the ground because they are not required
to conform to public land subdivisions, the legal system for
these mineral resources does not impose the regulatory
features common to the mature stage of resource system developmnent which is discussed below.
The possibility of such a transition existed as a result of
assessment of this and other resource systems undertaken
recently by the Public Land Law Review Commission. 2 Although changes were recommended, in the words of a minority
view to the Commission's report: "The recommended modifications preserve the location-patent approach devised more
than 100 years ago. It served an earlier period but cannot.
even as modified, provide an adequate legal framework for
the future.""3
As in the case of locatable minerals, the unimpeded rush
to exploitation of water resources led to the imposition of
some corrective action. The prior appropriation concept of
first in time, first in right continued to prevail, but state
governments began to be concerned that defective and badly
located diversion works wasted water; that no right became
definite until adjudicated; and that such adjudications were
often long delayed and not based on accurate measurements
of ditches or the land irrigated. To correct these defects in
the previous system, states began to impose administrative
controls of various kinds and degrees of iniensity.
51. See Coleman v. United States, 390 U.S. 599 (1968).
52. Established by Congress in 1964 to conduct a review of existing land laws
and regulations and recommend revisions necessary therein. 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1391-1400 (1970).
53.

PUBLIc LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND:
A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS 130 (1970).
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Wyoming established a system which was the forerunner
and, in some instances, a model for water administration systems established in most of the western United States to replace nonsupervision by state control of new appropriations
of water. Its procedure requires that anyone initiating new
appropriative rights must apply to state officials for permits. 4 In addition, Wyoming established a cooidinated system of public water rights control in order to provide for
acquisition, adjudication, and distribution of water to appropriators based on their relative rights. These administrative
systems corrected previous abuses, and represent a preliminary step toward the integrated, highly controlled water systems characteristic of many western states today. Not all of
the western states have chosen to correct abuses in this way.
Colorado, for example, has rejected a permit system and relies instead on special proceedings for determination of water
rights,5 5 tabulations of all decreed water rights,"6 and state
control over distribution over "adjudicated" water. 7
Another form of correction is to be found in the practice of leasing land or selling materials"8 which were formerly free for the taking. Perhaps the most important
example of this is to be found in the passage of the Mineral
Leasing Act of 1920" ' which converted acquisition of oil
rights on public domain to a leasing system.
At first, oil operators in the West secured petroleum
rights on the public domain under the placer mining laws.6"
So quickly did they move that the Director of the Geological
Survey reported, in 1909, to the Secretary of the Department
of the Interior:
"[T]he Government will be obliged to repurchase
the very oil that it has practically given away ...."
"In view of the increasing use of fuel by the American Navy there would appear to be an immediate
necessity for assuring the conservation of a proper
WYO. STAT. § 41-201 (1957).
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN., §§ 148-21-18 to 148-21-23 (Supp. 1969).
Id. §§ 148-21-27, 148-21-28.
Id. § 148-21-34.
30 U.S.C. § 601-04 (1970).
Act of Feb. 25, 1920, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 437, as amended, 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287
(1970).
60. Act of Feb. 11, 1897, ch. 216, 29 Stat. 526.

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
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supply of petroleum for the Government's own
use .... " and "pending the enactment of adequate
legislation on this subject, the filing of claims to oil
lands in the State of California should be suspended."'
The forces for national security were joined by conservation forces at this point, and private entry onto oil lands
was prevented by major withdrawals by the President of the
public domain. Following this, President Taft requested
confirmation of his action by Congress, and this was done
by the passage of the so-called Pickett Act.6 2 Under this act,
the President received discretionary power to "temporarily"
withdraw public lands from entry and to reserve such lands
for various "public purposes" to be specified in the withdrawal order.
With this power, the executive branch was able to withdraw almost all of the unappropriated public domain from
location for petroleum and related resources under the mining laws. During the decade 1910-1920, the disposition of
the lands which had been reserved produced much controversy. The compromise solution, the Mineral Leasing Act,
made the resource available, but on new and significantly
more restrictive terms.
As can he seen from the examples above, system correction can take many forma Statutes are narrowepd in scope.
They are construed strictly where formerly they were interpreted liberally. Lands are leased and materials sQld which
formerly were free for the taking. Administrative procedures are imposed where formerly they were absent. Regardless of the device employed, the end result is the same-a
more complicated, constrained system correcting or adjusting the previous system, and reflecting new and multiple objectives. We also see a fuller integration of the elements of
the resource system and the beginnings of fuller participation by other elements Itn society. The latter change is the
prelude to the mature stage of natural resource system development which is primarily characterized by regulation.
61. United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 466-67 (1915).
62. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 421, 36 Stat. 847 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 141-43
(1970)).
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Mature Stage-Rezulation
In the mature stage of development, the policy emphasis
hegins to shift to regulated exploitation under highly Integrated system conditions. Of course, resource systems are
exploited in earlier stages, but the operator proceeds with
scant concern about others, slight influence over, or even
awareness of the larger system of which he is a part, and with
limited or no social controls.
Some natural resource systems, however, under the influence of their physical characteristics, and technological,
economic, and social forces, may evolve into a more exmplex
stage with significantly higher levels of resource system integration. System integration inevitably brings with it a greater
degree of regulations not merely to correct malfunctions but
to achieve a variety of system objectives and to control its
operation. This regulation may be through private institutions or by state or federal government. It may take a
variety of forms, perhaps the most complete of which is the
regulation by the Federal Power Commission of sales and
prices of independent producers of natural gas sold to interstate pipelines. The authority of the Federal Power Commission to regulate interstate sales of natural gas is based
entirely on the Natural Gas Act of 1938.8
The Act's provisions do not specifically extend to producers or to wellhead sales of natural gas, and the Federal
Power Commission declined to regulate sales until 1954. It
began to regulate sales only after the Supreme Court held"
that independent producers are "natural gas companies"
within the meaning of Section 2(b) of the Natural Gas Act."5
This Act was an attempt to protect consumers during a time
of economic depression and rising gas prices along the eastern seaboard. Pipelines from the Appalachian region were
in the hands of a few holding companies. This created a
highly concentrated control of the market. While holding
companies dominated both production and distribution, they
segregated those activities into separate subsidiaries, the
63. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1970).
64. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. State of Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
65. 15 U.S.C. § 717 a(6) (1970).
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effect of which, if not the purpose, was to isolate some end
of their business from the reach of any one state regulatory
commission. The price of natural gas moved steadily upward
until the public demand for regulation culminated in the
Natural Gas Act.
The Federal Power Commission labored with obvious
difficulty under the terms of an ill-suited statute to use a
utility model of rate regulation for a diverse and growing.
industry. Any gas producer who wanted to sell his gas in interstate commerce was required to make an application for a
certificate of public convenience and necessity and to secure
approval of his rates based on his cost of service. Although
this method has been widely employed in various utility
rate-making situations, it ultimately proved inappropriate
for the regulation of independent gas producers which, as
resource companies, were unlike utilities in many significant
respects.
As a consequence, the Federal Power Commission turned
to fixing producer prices by means of proceedings applicable
to all producers in particular areas delineated by the Commission. 6 Although the area method was approved by the
Supreme Court, it also directed the Commission:
[T]o assess the requirements of the broad public
interests entrusted to its protection by Congress.
Accordingly, the "end result" of the Commission's
orders must be measured as much by the success
with which they protect those interests as by the effectiveness with which they "maintain . . . credit
and attract capital." 6 7
In so doing, the Commission may "employ price functionally
in order to achieve relevant regulatory purposes; it may, in
particular, take fully into account the probable consequences
of a given price level for future programs of exploration and
production."" This the Commission has done, and a complex
system of multiple price levels and other regulatory incentives and constraints are currently evolving which will con66. Upheld by the Supreme Court in Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S.
747 (1968).
67. Id. at 791.
68. Id. at 797.
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trol the total natural gas system in order to achieve changing
public interests.6"
Oil and gas are often, though not necessarily, found together in nature. They are also natural resources which involve a highly integrated system of production and distribution, an enormous investment of capital, and extremely sophisticated technology. Despite these similarities and some
equivalent end uses to which they both may be put, their
development took somewhat different courses, and the regulatory scheme for oil tended to emphasize state regulation
with federal assistance rather than the preemption of resource
regulation by the Federal Government which took place in
the interstate natural gas industry.
In the early days of oil production, the landowner could
and did drill and produce oil and gas from under his own
land, even though the oil or gas had migrated from adjoining
land owned by others. He could waste the product if he
wished, even if it injured his neighbor or depleted a valuable
national resource. This rule of capture took no account of
the fact that an oil field is an integrated physical system,
and led adjoining landowners into wasteful economic drilling
practices. To prevent the loss of oil to competitors, operators
rushed to drill unnecessary wells which decreased reservoir
pressure, reduced the maximum ultimate production of the
field, and forced producers to produce the maximum amount
of oil even though field or market conditions dictated a different course of action.
In time, the waste and conflict became so intolerable that
the courts imposed minor limitations on private operations,
and some legislation was passed requiring plugging of abandoned wells, dispatch of oil to proper storage and transportation facilities, and prohibiting wasteful use and the escape
of gas. As could be expected, restraints on the taking of oil
and gas by a landowner or lessee were attacked bitterly as
an unconstitutional taking of private property without due
process. At first, the rationalization for limiting private
freedom in oil field production was that it was a valid exer69. See, e.g., Southern Louisiana Area Rate Cases, 428 F.2d 407 (5th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 950 (1970).
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cise of the police power of the State which was necessary to
maintain correlative rights of landowners in a supply of oil
and gas which they shared. From this it was a short and not
inconsistent step to regulating reservoir pressure 0 and restricting the number of wells that could be drilled in a given
area.
These early decisions and legislation did more than correct wasteful exploitation of the oil and gas resources of the
nation and related abuses. They marked the initiation of a
legal framework for regulation of an integrated natural resource system. Once this was done, the system continued to
mature further with common purchaser statutes,71 followed
by other types of statutes designed to prevent waste by encouraging or requiring unit operation" and secondary recovery practices.7
Most of these types of regulatory devices are directed at
narrowly defined subsystems, as small as the property of
individuals or as large as an entire oil pool or field. This
degree of integration, however useful it was in preventing
physical waste in a specific area, was inadequate to cope with
sharp fluctuations in price brought on by unrestricted oil
production of old fields and the low-cost supplies which
70. In order to maintain the reservoir pressure needed for petroleum production,
state regulatory authorities do not permit wells to produce at full force,
as under flush production conditions; rather, their rate of production is
reduced to a point which will preserve reservoir pressure and facilitate
the maximum recovery of petroleum from the reservoir. This is described
as the MER of the reservoir-the maximum efficient rate at which production can be secured without impairing the efficiency of reservoir drive.
Second, ratios are prescribed to assure that neither gas nor water pressure
is unduly dissipated; oil can be produced only in prescribed ratios to gas
and water. Where the ratios are exceeded, oil production must be curtailed
or pressure maintained by injecting the excess water or gas back into the
reservoir.
71. Enactments of this type may be applied to require a pipeline purchaser to
take ratably from all wells with which it is connected; or the pipeline may
be required to go further and establish connections with additional wells,
from which ratable taking is also required.
72. Unit operations involve the combination of separately owned or leased
tracts of land overlying a common source of supply for operational purposes.
Wells are placed at locations and produced at rates which are efficient for
the pool as a unit. Production is apportioned among each participating
owner or lessee on an equitable basis regardless of the location of the well
through which production is secured. Voluntary unitizations do not require
state approval. Compulsory unitization statutes are in force in most producing states. See 5 SUMMERS: THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS 193-225 (1969),
for citations of pertinent state statutes.
73. Secondary recovery involves injecting gas and fluids into a producing
stratum in order to maintain pressure and thereby increase the amount of
hydrocarbons ultimately recoverable.
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periodically flooded the market when new fields were discovered. Because of the doctrines of capture, it was not
practical for individual owners to make voluntary curtailments of production. Using a conservation justification, an
extensive system of interlocking state and federal regulations
was designed to limit oil production. Through these regulations, which take a variety of forms, production is limited
to consumptive demand in states producing about threequarters of the petroleum in the United States. The means
by which this is accomplished is primarily through the establishment of proration systems by which oil production is
limited and production quotas are assigned to individual producers. Although there are many variations on the theme,
proration systems generally operate in the following sequence:
Based on anticipated demand, state regulatory agencies establish the statewide total of production for
several months ahead.
Deductions from the statewide total are made for
certain categories of wells such as small operator
and low production wells which are not economic
unless they operate at full capacity. These exemptions, incidentally, can be substantial.
The balance of allowable statewide production is
then prorated to the remaining wells according to a
depth-acreage formula.
In establishing the statewide total of production, the
regulating agency in each state has to estimate supply and
demand. The U.S. Bureau of Mines provides projections of
future oil consumption and the large oil companies submit
"nominations" or estimates of the amount of oil they intend
to purchase in the state during the proration period under
consideration. Prices are not fixed by the regulating agency,
nor does any federal authority coordinate the production
ceilings fixed by the individual states.7 Federal law, how74. However, on August 27, 1935, Congress approved the Interstate Oil Compact
to Conserve Oil and Gas "by the prevention of physical waste thereof from
any cause." H.R.J. Res. No. 407, art. II, 49 Stat. 940. Over 25 member
states now belong to the Interstate Oil Compact Commission which carries
out the administrative functions of the Compact to provide a forum for the
discussion of industry problems and for exchange of information.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol8/iss2/2

22

Kratchman: The Rise and Fall of Natural Resource Systems

1973

NATURAL RESOURCE SYSTEMS

ever, provides a powerful instrument to make state regulation
effective in that the Connally Hot Oil Act" prohibits interstate shipment of oil produced in excess of the amount permitted by state conservation regulations. This system of mutual restraint by the states supplemented by federal administrative and statutory support effectively limits production
and stabilizes prices. As a result of recent shortages of oil and
a strong demand, limitations on production have been lifted,
but could be reimposed if required.
During the 1950's when the entire domestic system of
state production regulation was imperiled by low-cost imports, the Federal Government stepped in to protect the bulk
of the market for domestic producers by establishing the Mandatory Oil Import Program." This program regulates imports through a variety of separate quota levels and allocates
permitted imports among domestic refiners and historical
importers. The overall level of import restriction is set in
percentage terms and has not varied significantly since the
inception of the program. For the states west of the Rocky
Mountains and Alaska and Hawaii (District V), the crudeproducts quota is set at the difference between estimated
demand and estimated U.S. and Canadian supply produced
in or shipped into the District. Thus, District V producers
receive 100 percent protection from imports. Imports are
allowed to displace a limited portion of domestic capacity in
Districts I to IV, consisting of all states east of the Rockies.
In those Districts, a crude-product import quota level has
been set at 12.2 percent of estimated production.
The use of quotas to regulate the operation of natural
resource systems is not limited to oil. In today's highly overintefrom
resources
low-cost
commerce,
grated, worldwide
seas often are or seem to be a threat to the continued existence
of many domestic resource systems. For example, in the past
decade potash imports have climbed from about ten percent
to forty percent of domestic consumption. As a result, there
75. 15 U.S.C. §§ 715-715m (1970).
76. The Mandatory Oil Import Program was established by President Eisenhower's Proclamation No. 3279, issued March, 10, 1959, 24 Fed. Reg. 1781,
under authority of Section 2 of the Trade Agreements Act of July 1, 1954,
Pub.L.No. 85-686, § 2, 72 Stat. 673.
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is substantial excess production capability as compared to
consumption, prices drop, and unemployment rises. Protective devices of various kinds are proposed. In the case of
potash, proposals have been made to limit imports to less
than twenty-five percent of domestic production. A different,
more sophisticated device has been proposed for lead and
zinc. For these minerals, recommendations have been made
to establish quotas to come into effect whenever stocks owned
by primary producers exceed a specified percentage of the
average shipments of either metal during a 3-month period.
Under this arrangement, there is no requirement that the
inventory buildup be due to increased imports. Increased
productive capacity could lead to excess supplies and control
of imports could therefore be determined by the industry.
Fluctuations in relative supply and demand may bring
remissions in the condition of various systems and the demand
for quotas may vary accordingly. For example, in 1958, import quotas restricted the imports of lead and zinc ores to
eighty percent of the average commercial imports during
1953-57. Later, when conditions of trade in lead and zinc
materially changed so that consumption substantially exceeded production, prices increased sharply and the quotas
were terminated in 1965. Still later, when conditions reverted to supply exceeding demand, the demand for quotas
rose again. Oil import quotas, considered sacrosanct since
being established in 1959, are beginning to be reevaluated,"
and although President Nixon has not chosen to act on the
recommendations of his task force, he has relaxed import
quotas7 8 in light of rapidly increasing domestic demands
which are exceeding supply capabilities.
In general, control of oil and gas involves governmental
regulation over a highly integrated, private network, but private enterprise is responsible, as a rule, for production of the
resource which is to be marketed. In the case of water, federal
77.

CABINET TASK FORCE ON OIL IMPORT CONTROL, THE OIL IMPORT QUESTION,
A REPORT ON THE RELATIONSHIP OF OIL IMPORTS AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY

(1970).
78. Proclamation 4156, Sept. 18, 1972, 37 Fed. Reg. 19115. This Proclamation
modifies Proclamation 3279, supra note 75, to permit additional imports
of No. 2 fuel oil, and allows holders of certain allocations under Proclamation 3279, to import petroleum and its derivatives in advance of allocations
to be made for 1973.
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or state governments may go even one step further by themselves undertaking enterprises, often of vast size, for the
purposes of water production, i.e., capture, storage, and
distribution. These governmental units also fix water prices
at a "desirable" level by manipulation or subsidies of various kinds.
The Federal Reclamation Program provides a good
example of this type of extended regulation of a natural
resource system. Like the motivation for natural gas regulation, Congress wished to counteract monopoly or oligopoly,
the evils of which were acutely felt during a period of economic depression. It was not long before the dream of free
land in the West for a family-based agriculture established
securely on homesteads79 came face to face with the reality
of aridity in western states, and the impossibility of using
160 acres for agriculture without irrigation. But the creation
of irrigation works demanded the expenditure of capital
far beyond the capacity of the homesteaders. In the late
nineteenth century when times turned bad and a number of
private irrigation companies went bankrupt, and then some
dams failed, it was inevitable that the farmers turned to the
only institution capable of constructing the necessary irrigation works-the Federal Government.
After an unsuccessful attempt to encourage state and
private irrigation initiatives,8" a federal reclamation program
was started in 1902.81 Under this program, water is provided
from irrigation works built by the Federal Government for
use on no more than 160 acres in individual private ownership. Originally, the program was to have been self-supporting, but over the years a substantial subsidy has been made
available to irrigators. They enjoy interest-free, long-term
loans; irrigation costs are covered by reclamation project
revenues from electric power and from sale of municipal and
industrial water; and costs of multiple-purpose projects are
often charged heavily to the non-irrigation parts of the
79. See aupra note 17.
80. Act of Aug. 18, 1894, ch. 301, § 4, 28 Stat. 422 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 641
(1970)).
81. Act of June 17, 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388 (codified in scattered sections
of 43 U.S.C.).
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project, thereby reducing the ultimate costs payable by irrigators. The Secretary of the Department of the Interior, who
is responsible for the reclamation program, contracts with
water user associations which assume the repayment obligation, backed by a power to tax lands within the project.
The pricing controls of government reclamation projects
extend not only to water but to land as well. To safeguard
against monopoly, the original reclamation act specified:
"No right to the use of water for land in private ownership
shall be sold for a tract exceeding one hundred and sixty
acres to any one landowner, .... ." In its present statutory
form,83 the Secretary of the Interior now has the authority
to specify the appraisal methods whereby the non-irrigated
value of land is to be determined, and to withhold project
water unless the owners of the land agree to execute a valid
recordable contract at a price not to exceed the appraisal
price.
It is beyond the scope of this discussion to present details
of the law84 that has developed in connection with the development of the Colorado River system which is the only significant source of water in an area of 242,000 square miles in the
western states, comprising one-twelfth of the continental
United States. Because of its obvious importance, it is also
the most highly controlled river in the United States in which
the Secretary of the Interior, as the person who operates the
storage works on the river, exercises authority across a wide
range of policy decision-making. For example, he sets the
operating criteria for coordinated long-range operation of
federal reservoirs on the Colorado River so as to facilitate
82. Id. § 5, at 389 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 431 (1970)).
83. 43 U.S.C. § 423e (1970).
84. The main elements of the "Law of the River" consist of the Colorado River
Compact, WITMER, DOCUMENTS ON THE USE AND CONTROL OF THE WATERS OF
INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL STREAMS 39 (1956); the Upper Colorado
River Basin Compact, Id. at 218, 63 Stat. 31 (1949); Treaty with Mexico
on Water Utilization, Feb. 3, 1944, 59 Stat. 1219 (1945), T.S. No. 994;
the Boulder Canyon Project Act, 45 Stat. 1057 (1928) (codified at 43 U.S.C.
§§ 617-617t (1970)); the Boulder Canyon Project Adjustment Act, 54
Stat. 774 (1940) (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 618-618o (1970)) ; the Colorado
River Storage Project Act, 70 Stat. 105 (1956) (codified at 43 U.S.C.
§§ 620-620o (1970)); the Colorado River Basin Project Act, 82 Stat. 885
(1968) (codified in scattered sections of 43 U.S.C.); and the various
Supreme Court decisions culminating in Arizona v. California, 376 U.S.
340 (1963).
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water regulation." In so doing, he assures the availability
of water to supply the consumptive uses apportioned by the
1922 Colorado River compact, subject to certain priorities,
and balances water supply levels in the Lake Mead and Lake
Powell reservoirs so that they shall both rise and fall in
general, but not necessarily in exact correlation with each
other. He may also, in connection with the Central Arizona
Project, the largest reclamation project in the river system,
enter into arrangements with non-federal utilities to acquire
by prepayment of costs the right to capacity in large thermalelectric power plants which will be used for pumping requirements in distribution of river water to users in central
Arizona.
The sweeping powers exercised by the Secretary of the
Interior in connection with the Colorado River do not constitute the totality of control applied to waters in the western
United States. Those described here serve only to illusrate
another form of regulation of a capital-intensive, fully integrated natural resource system.
We have seen examples of mature systems in which regulation, as in oil and gas, was intended to stabilize markets
mainly through price and supply control. For water, regulation extends still further back into what may be called the
"production subsystem," but there are many irrigators who
do not participate. One must turn to special resources like
helium and enriched uranium to find examples (though likely
to be comparatively short lived and, in the case of helium,
involving less than comprehensive control in recent years) of
total regulation extending over the full range of production,
distribution, marketing, and participation.
On earth, helium is generally found only in natural gas.
Unless the helium is extracted from the natural gas before
delivery to the consumer, the helium will be dissipated into
the atmosphere when the gas is burned. The cost of extracting helium from natural gas is proportional to its concentration, and a 0.3 percent concentration is customarily considered
to be the economic cutoff point. The natural gas fields of
85. 35 Fed. Reg. 8951 (1970).
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Kansas-Oklahoma-Texas (mainly the Hugoton and Panhandle Fields) are unique in that they contain far more
natural gas with helium at concentrations of one percent
than any other known source. To conserve this valuable resource, a new conservation program was begun in 1960.8"
Prior to this time, the U.S. Bureau of Mines had produced
and distributed all helium and set the prices for Government
and non-Government users alike. Under the new program,
private plants were built on the basis of long-term supply
contracts and the extracted helium was stored underground
near Amarillo, Texas. To make the program self-sustaining,
the price of helium was almost doubled. This led private
producers to start supplying non-federal helium consumers,
from major sources of helium in the ilugoton area not covered by Government storage contracts, at prices substantially
below the Bureau of Mines price. Since the Government
lacked a monopoly and the price was set at a level profitable
to industry, the attempt to regulate the resource is malfunctioning and the Administration is attempting to abandon the
program. This action is justified in part on the grounds that
the need for conservation is ended since Government needs
can be met from stored helium, and new technology will permit extraction from newly discovered, lower grade sources.
The fissionable uranium isotope, uranium-235, is like
helium-rare and found in low concentrations. It is this
latter quality, together with its fissionable properties which
has created the circumstances for governmental production,
price fixing, and control of foreign imports of this resource.
Because the process of separating uranium-235 from the
,other isotopes with which it occurs is extremely difficult,
expensive, and uses a classified technology, the enrichment
plants in which the process is carried out all belong to the
Federal Government. These enrichment plants produce enriched uranium which is made available at a Government
specified price for private nuclear reactor power plants.
They also process foreign uranium source materials into
enriched uranium subject to the condition that the enriched
86. The Helium Act Amendments of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-777, 74 Stat. 918
(codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 167-167n (1970)).
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uranium from foreign sources must be reexported and cannot
be used in domestic nuclear facilities.
Old Age-Disintegration
When a natural resource system reaches the final stage
of its development, the cycle which began with primitive and
unfettered exploitation and passed through successive stages
of legitimation, correction, and regulation, ends with disintegration. The increasing degree of system integration which
is characteristic of a growing system now is reversed. There
are fewer participants, they interact with one another less
frequently, and the need or expectation of coordination diminishes. The flow of capital is out of, not into, the resource
system, and the capital stock is reduced through depletion or
through neglect. Maintenance is abandoned, and access to
the resource becomes progressively more difficult. Regulation is progressively diminished.
Very few resource systems have reached the point of old
age in the United States. Gold mining represents the best
example. Historically, the United States led the world in the
production of gold from 1849, the year after gold was discovered in California, until 1905 when the Union of South
Africa became the world's leading gold producer. In 1934,
when President Roosevelt set a price of $35 an ounce and
controlled the industry rigidly, gold was selling at $20 an
ounce. Since then, the cost of almost all commodities, including mining machinery and labor, has increased many times
over-with no corresponding change in the price of gold.
In addition, early in World War II, American gold producers were denied access to supplies, equipment, and manpower needed for mining operations. 7 Although the limitation was rescinded July 1, 1945, many gold mines never recovered from its effects and remain closed to this day. As a
consequence of these events, production has declined steadily
so that now the United States consumes some four times
more than it produces. In an effort to prevent continued disintegration, a variety of legislative proposals have been made
87. War Production Board Limitation Order L-208, October 8, 1942, 7 Fed.
Reg. 7992.
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over the past twenty years."8 One of the more recent proposals recommended that American gold producers receive payments from the Government based on the differences in the
costs of gold production in 1939 and costs of production today
on an individual gold mine basis. None of these proposals
has been implemented, and although recent rises in the price
of gold on the world market have stimulated some domestic
exploration and development, the downward movement in
the viability of the gold mining industry continues.
It should be noted that price has a profound influence
on resource system development, particularly in its later
stages. Resources are not depleted abruptly. Typically,
richest concentrations of ore are mined first, or oil fields
under high pressure are exploited most easily. Later, lower
ore content may be compensated for by economies of scale or
improved technology and, in oil fields, pumping or injection
of gas or water may replace natural energies as the driving
force for lifting the oil to the surface. At some point, incremental costs exceed returns and exploitation ceases-not because there is no more resource, but because it costs more to
get it than it is worth. If the market changes and prices go
upward, then additional costs can be incurred and exploitation can be resumed. Ultimately, for all practical purposes
a resource is totally depleted regardless of economics and in a
metaphorical sense "death" occurs. Certain types of endangered animal species, considered a resource by some or perhaps certain types of tree stands would fall in this category.
CONCLUSION

The idea that natural resource systems pass through suc" cesive stages of growth and decline, each of which is characterized by typical features due to specific causes, is an abstraction, the value of which must be assessed. To do so, it is useful to consider its utility as a tool for organizing facts; as a
basis for research which can develop greater insight into
natural resource systems; as a guideline for evaluating policy
for existing natural resource systems, or for new resource
88. For a comprehensive tabulation, see Appendix in AMERICAN GoLD
REVITALIZATION, S. REP. No. 67, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
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systems which develop when social and economic developments change free goods into allocative resources.
The ingenuity of man is so great, the exploitative values
and physical characteristics of natural resources are so
varied, and the social, technological, and economic influences
on resource development are so diverse that it is no surprise
that the law of natural resources seems so fragmented with
each subsystem isolated from the other. And yet, is a quota
for lead and zinc any different from an oil quota in its policy
and ultimate legal implications? Is there any essential distinction between the oyster farmer who limits access to his
beds in the Chesapeake Bay and the rancher who sets up a
leasing system under the Taylor Grazing Act," which is
administered by local ranchers in each area, and which perpetuates the right of ranchers to use the public domain on a
preferential basis and even sell the right to such preference
if and when the private property adjoining the public domain
is sold?
It is the thesis of this article that the similarities are
equal to, if not more important than, the differences. From
the similarities, a pattern of development can be perceived
which brings order out of a welter of facts. At the sane time,
and more importantly, it provides a framework for research.
For example, more and better criteria may be formulated to
characterize each stage of development. These criteria may
be quantified and undergirded with econometric analyses."
Some systems may not conform to the model. Exploration
of the reasons for this variation may provide critical insights
into the system under study by focusing attention on the
underlying reasons for its lack of correspondence. Out of this
may come modifications to the system or refinement of the
model which will make it a more workable tool for understanding natural resource systems.
The essential test, however, of the proposed model is in
its policy implications. Can the model be used to assess our
89. 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-315r (1970) (original enacted as the Act of June 29, 1934,
ch. 865, 48 Stat. 1269).
90. Smith, Economics of Production from Natural Resources, 63 AMERICAN
ECONOMIC REVIEW, 409-31 (1968).
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existing practices, does it tell us where trouble may be coming,
ahd can it provide guidelines in coping with the development
of new resource systems?
The United State, as a nation and society, has become a
complex, systems-integra-ted, capital-intensive, technologically
advanced mass democracy. As such, there can no longer be
any place in it for a comparatively few non-interacting individudls to operate in a primitive environment with little or
no legal framework, and jutact the United States has no significant natural resource in which this is the case. It is to
the credit of the United States that it recognizes the implicaions of the concept of "spaceship earth," and has, through
its efforts, attempted to bring the great resources of space"
and the oceans, which are still in many respects in the embryonic stage, into some legal frhmework.
The policy question remains-are there any systems
which are now at a stage of development unsuited to the,
optimum exploitation of the resource or to the needs of the
natiob? Since most of major systems have reached a "mature" stage, reflfcting the general evolution of the country,
attention focuses on those systems which have not reach that
stage. One might expect that the farther a natural resource
system is from a "'mature" stage, the greater will be the
disparity between reality and optimum. This expectation is
fulfilled in the examples of oyster fisheries and mining of
lQcatable minerals chosen previously in this discussion to
illqstrate youthful resource systems.
Oyster production in the Chesapeake Bay is clearly not at
an optimum. In the past century, its production has declined
by more thian seventy percent. This reduction may be explained, in part, by the'degradation of the Chesapeake Bay
91. American space technology has been applied to the practical benefit of
mankind througin the establishment of a global commercial communications
satellite system. The Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT) is
an instrument created by Congress to participate in the International
Telecommunications Satellite Consortium (INTELSAT), and is also the
manager of and has the largest ownership interest in the earth stations
with which the U.S. utilizes INTELSAT satellites for international service. For details on COMSAT and other efforts by the United States to
open space to cooperative, international development, see SENATE COMM.
ON AERONAUTICAL AND SPACE SCIENCES,
OUiER SPACE: A SYMPOSIUM, S. DOC. No.

INTERNATIONAL

COOPERATION

IN

92-57, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
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ecosystem due to pollution, silt, and competing plant growth.
More important, however, have been the economic and legal
constraints which have maintained access to the resource at
traditional modes. The State of Maryland has mounted a
restoration program for the oyster beds, but has not succeeded
in its objective of establishing a fishery which is self -sustaining and unsubsidized.
The problems of mining locatable minerals are in many
respects the results of carrying over, into a more advanced
stage, practices which are now obsolete. Today's legal doctrine, with some minor exceptions,9" require physical evidence of discovery which is a necessary prerequisite to staking
a valid claim. This requirement of physical evidence was
appropriate in a day when exploration was tied to the ground,
relied on what the eye could see, and chemical assay verify.
But today's sophisticated exploration methods can detect
deposits which are not visible to the eye, may be buried far
below the surface, and are often discovered from aircraft.
In such circumstances, the concept of physical discovery is
not only outmoded but is also a hindrance to resource development because it is not broad enough to encompass the changed
meaning of what constitutes discovery.
A strong pattern of unrestrained, individual action is
also carried over in the manner in which land is claimed for
locatable minerals and the terms and conditions under which
the minerals are removed. When a discovery is made and a
claim staked, the law requires that a record of the claim be
made at the county seat where the discovery is made. Even
though it is federal land which is claimed, the Federal Government is not notified, nor is it necessary for the party making
the claim to tie its location to the public land survey grid of
92. Because it is sometimes necessary to undertake physical exploration before
achieving discovery, the doctrine of pedis possession has been developed
to protect the person occupying the claim before the requisite discovery.
In the words of the Supreme Court: "[A] miner may hold the place in
which he may be working ... and while he remains in possession, diligently
working towards discovery, is entitled-at least for a reasonable time-to be protected. . . ." Union Oil Co. v. Smith, 249 U.S. 337, 346-47 (1919).
See Olson, New Frontiers in Pedie Poeseesio: MacGuire v. Stu'gis, 7 LAND
AND WATER LAW REvmw 367 (1972). Some weakening of the requirement
for physical evidence of discovery is to be found in Dallas v. Fitzsimmons,
137 Colo. 196, 323 P.2d 274 (1958); Rummell v. Bailey, 7 Utah 2d 137, 320
P.2d 653 (1958).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1973

33

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 8 [1973], Iss. 2, Art. 2
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. VIII

township, ranges, and sections. Since the Federal Government is awarding oil and gas leases on these same lands, the
opportunity for occurrence of conflict and confusion is great 9
and both systems are hindered in their operation,
In the latter half of the nineteenth century, the prevailing
outlook assumed that full, unimpeded exploitation of natural
resources would produce the greatest return to the nation as'
a whole. Consequently, no royalty was required from mining
operations on the public domain. This practice remains unchanged for locatable minerals even though substantial revenues now accrue to the Federal Government as a result of
rents, royalties, and bonuses now paid for the opportunity to
exploit deposits of oil, gas, sulfur, and a variety of other
substances covered by the Mineral Leasing Law of 1920,"
as amended. Dissatisfaction, with the continuance of this
privilege, as well as the previously mentioned problems concerning recordation and the requirement of discovery, has
prompted remedial recommendations from the Public Land
Law Review Commission."
One should not assume that a system which displays indicia of maturity is in some preferred state of equilibri-um.
Regulation, wlich characterizes this stage, spans a broad
range of intervention1. Such intervention may be well adapted
at one time and because of externaiities of many kinds may
become ill-suited for a particllar resource system. In general,
interventions begin as preventive steps for conservation purposes or a remedy for supply-demand imbalance or to achieve
some other national objective. In time, this intervention tends
to become protectionist, invoking import restrictions, subsidy,
and market stabilization. Where this takes place, unnecessary misallocation of economic resources may take place.
In 1924, the Department of the Interior ruled that in the case of Joseph
E. McClory, 50 L.D. 623 (1924), during the life of A prospecting permit,
any entry under the general mining laws was precluded. No significant
conflicts between the mining and leasing acts arose until difficulty was
encountered in the exploitation of uranium ores on the Colorado Plateau
which were also situated on lands covered by federal oil and gas leases.
Stop gap relief was provided in 30 U.S.C. §§ 501-05 (1970), and a more
definitive resolution of the problem was achieved in the Multiple Mineral
Development Act, Act of Aug. 13, 1954, ch. 730, 68 Stat. 708 (codified at
30 U.S.C. §§ 521-31 (1970)).
94. 30 U.S.C. §§,,181-287 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of Feb. 25, 1920,
ch. 85, 41 Stat. 437).
95. Supra note 52, at 128.

93.
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The review of oil import quotas9" represents a top-level
assessment of an important method of system regulation and
evaluation of alternative ways of achieving national objectives. Although the recommendations of the task force were
not implemented, at a later date lesser modifications of the
quota systems did take place. After several years of study,
the National Water Commission is proposing that the full
costs of irrigation water be paid by farmer beneficiaries.
Both of these instances represent situations where regulation
or intervention had gone further than current circumstances
warrant and a reversion to a less regulated, less protected
or subsidized basis would result in optimizing the economic
factors of the natural resource system.
In the United States, only gold mining has reached old
aged in its development. The fact remains that we do not
know how to deal with natural resource systems that reach
such a point. We can expect that other systems as they are depleted, or become lower in grade and increasingly uneconomic,
will also experience disintegration. Should such systems be
allowed to terminate ? Should incentives be created to stretch
out the decline, avoid low priority uses, and encourage consolidations, capital in-flow, or research and development ? As
a nation, we are unfamiliar with problems of disintegration
and we tend to ignore the problems of entropy in the various
forms it takes. Perhaps an early examination of questions
related to aging natural resource systems is overdue.
Does the perspective of resource cycles help in determining what to do with "new" natural resource systems ?
As we become more numerous or require previously unused
resources for technological purposes, or create resources
through cultural or social reorientation, we are faced with the
challenge of incorporating a new or unused resource into a
far more complex society than existed earlier in our history.
The overall maturation of the United States has reached
the point that neither an embryonic nor early youthful phase
of development is appropriate any more. Since a "new" system is in the process of integration rather than the reverse,
approaches suitable for old systems are inappropriate as
96. Supra note 76.
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well. By a process of elimination, the number of alternatives

are limited, subject, of course, to numerous specialized variations required by the intrinsic features of the resource itself.
Policy for "new" natural resource systems may, broadly
speaking, be unregulated but with some safeguards to prevent
windfalls, wastage, or similar undesirable conditions. Alternatively, regulation may be established at the outset, involving public intervention in the system at high or low levels
of intensity. The development of oil shale provides a good
example of this process at work.
The oil shales in the western United States constitute the
greatest reserve of oil on earth. The oil content of the shales
varies, but shales assaying twenty-five gallons or more of oil
per ton contain an estimated 600 billion barrels of oil. The
Federal Government owns almost three-fourths of the oil
shale acreage and about eighty percent of the oil shales in
place. Before 1920, fee simple ownership of Federal oil
shale could be acquired under the Oil Placer Act of 1897."7
The resource then passed into the regulatory phase with the
passage of the Mineral Leasing Act 8 which provided for
leasing of federal oil shale lands by the Secretary of the Interior. The situation, however, was frozen ten years later
when the oil shale lands were temporarily withdrawn from
disposal." The Secretary of the Interior was later given the
authority to lift the order,"'0 but this has not yet been done.
A resource of such great value cannot be kept intact indefinitely, and only the righ rate of discovery and production
of liquid petroleum and the political implications of disposing of such an enormously profitable resource allowed the
difficult job of policy-making for oil shales to be postponed
since 1930.
During the past decade, interest in the oil shales renewed
and momentum for exploitation has accelerated sharply. In
1964, an Oil Shale Advisory Board was appointed, but they
97. Act of Feb. 11, 1897, ch. 216, 29 Stat. 526.
98. Act of Feb. 25, 1920, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 437, as amended, 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287

(1970).

99. Exec. Order Nos. 5327, April 15, 1930; 6016, February 6, 1933; and 7038,
May 13, 1935.
100. Exec. Order No. 10355, May 26, 1952, 17 Fed. Reg. 4831.
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were unable to reach agreement on the key issue of ways and
means of opening federal oil shale lands for private leasing.
This was then followed in 1967 by the issuance of proposed
regulations by then Secretary of the Interior, Steward L.
These regulations, among other things, provided for
Udall.'
two-step development leases. In the first step, the contractor
would expend research and development funds on relatively
small acreages. If the Secretary of the Interior finds the
work successful, acreages large enough for commercial production would be made available. Work would be done under
tight controls with royalties ranging up to fifty percent of
the net income from the property. The right to use inventions
made during the research term of the lease was to be made
available to the public without charge.
This attempt to lease federal oil shale lands under terms
and conditions which represented a significant governmental
intervention in operations, resource economics, and externalities was unsuccessful. It was followed by another program proposal issued by the current Secretary of the Interior,
Rogers C. B. Morton."' The current proposed regulations
provide an initial permit period of core drilling to assess
environmental and resource characteristics of selected lease
sites. Resource data will remain confidential for five years
or until the permit lands are leased for oil shale. Leases
would be granted on the basis of sealed, competitive bonus
bids with rentals as required by the Mineral Leasing Act and
royalties at the rate of twelve cents for each ton of oil shale
containing thirty gallons of shale oil per ton of material.
These and other technical provisions of the regulations provide for substantially less governmental intervention and potentially greater financial return to private industry than did
the Udall proposals, and in many ways resemble a stage of
development just prior to or at the outset of regulation. The
purpose of this article is not to compare or to evaluate these
different proposed regulations, but rather to indicate that
they represent fundamentally different approaches in their
placement of oil shale in the scale of evolutionary develop101. 32 Fed. Reg. 7086 (1967).
102. Dep't of Interior, Program Statement for the Proposed Prototype Oil Shale
Leasing Program (June 1971).
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ment of resource systems. One factor in assessing the suitability of a given policy can be whether the placement proposed
is consonant with the actual degree of integration, level of
technological skill and capital investment, and other developmental characteristics of the resource under consideration.
Having described a model of natural resource systems
and indicated some possible uses of the model, it is only right
to close with some cautions about its limitations. Much of the
social change about us is not evolutionary; it is discontinuous,
discrete, and nondirectional. Since the impact of social developments on natural resource systems has been referred to
previously in this article, is not the evolutionary analogy
developed here possibly a mere metaphor? Is it proper to
group non-renewable resources like minerals with renewable
resources like cattle or water? Isn't the fact that oil, gas,
and water are found in the fluid state critical in their degree
of system integration as compared to the solid resources such
as gold and immovable resources like land? Should scarce
substances like uranium and helium be treated separately
from resources which are more plentiful and not tinged with
the national security? These are, of course, among the differences which one might anticipate would influence the
tactics of development. Whether these differences are so
basic that the course of development for individual resources
is unique for each resource is the question addressed here in
the negative. Each reader can apply his experience and
knowledge of his own specialty to judge whether the thesis
is valid and useful.
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